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Abstract. I examine three major anti-religious arguments that are oft en pro-
posed in various forms by cognitive and evolutionary scientists, and indicate 
possible responses to them. A fundamental problem with the entire debate 
arises because the term “religion” is too vague. So I reformulate the debate in 
terms of a less vague central concept: faith. Referring mainly to Aquinas on 
faith, I proceed by evaluating how the previously mentioned cognitive and evo-
lutionary arguments fare when dealing with faith. Th e results show that some 
aspects of the concept of faith are in principle beyond the range of evolutionary 
explanation and some other aspects are not. Nevertheless, an evolutionary ac-
count merges smoothly with faith’s theological dimensions.
Th is paper deals with the epistemological foundations of religion. Th e 
basic question is: “Does evolutionary explanation undermine religion?” 
To answer this question, I will start by illustrating how evolutionary ex-
planation has been extended from biology, its natural habitat, to reli-
gion, its fi nal frontier, according to some. Current studies in this area 
proceed in their overall approach on the paths already traced by vari-
ous predecessors that go all the way back to Charles Darwin himself.1 
I will focus mainly on the current situation. In the fi rst section, I will 
argue that underneath the arguments issuing from these evolutionary 
accounts, whether for or against religion, there lies a major problem that 
oft en goes unmentioned. Th is has to do with the very notion of religion. 
Could it be that more progress becomes possible in this area if, instead of 
1 Typical current studies include Boyer (2001), Atran (2002), Plantinga (2002), Sloan 
Wilson (2003), Schloss & Murry (2009). Major precedents include Teilhard de Chardin 
(1955), and Darwin himself in Darwin (1874).
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working with the central notion of religion, we work with the narrower 
notion of faith? To explore this sub-question, I dedicate the second sec-
tion to a clarifi cation of the notion of faith, building up on the foun-
dations set by Aquinas. Th en, in the third section, I will determine the 
extent to which the evolutionary accounts mentioned before apply with 
more profi t to the understanding of faith. My hope is that the analysis 
will allow me to articulate a plausible version of the notion of faith con-
sistent with evolutionary anthropology.
I. EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNTS OF RELIGION
Although the literature is vast, one may safely say that the core ingredi-
ent of this research program is simple. Since evolutionary principles have 
been successfully applied to explain human biology, they should also be 
applied to explain religion. Th ese principles include three main elements. 
In brief, we need random mutation of a hereditary trait that is crucial for 
survival. Once these three elements are present within a self-replicating 
system, natural selection occurs in the long run. Of course, for any given 
organism, there can be many traits that satisfy this triple condition; con-
sequently, natural selection may occur simultaneously at various fronts 
as regards the same species. For religion to fall within the range of this 
kind of explanation, it must have some feature that satisfi es the triple 
condition. Hence, evolutionary psychologists interested in off ering an 
evolutionary explanation of religion must fi rst locate an aspect of their 
object of study that is evolutionarily relevant in this sense. Once they fi x 
this, they will be able to tell a story whereby the presence of this aspect 
can be seen as the product of natural selection. An evolutionary explana-
tion of religion would thus be available. Two broad camps will be consid-
ered: one holds that some aspects of religion are genuinely located within 
the range of evolutionary explanation. Th ese aspects are adaptive, in the 
sense that they confer a survival advantage on the organisms that have 
them. Th e other camp holds that there is no such evolutionarily relevant 
aspect of religion. All aspects of religion are neutral. Religion confers nei-
ther advantages nor disadvantages for the survival of the organism.2 
2 Other kinds of argument are available. For instance, it is also possible to argue 
that religion confers serious disadvantages for survival, but that these disadvantages are 
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Let’s start with the adaptive camp. Th e evolutionarily relevant aspects 
of religion most commonly referred to in this context are two: one in-
volving supernatural agents, and the other involving super-knowing 
judges. Th e fi rst one is the one most widely discussed. Child psycholo-
gists have discovered that small infants perceiving moving objects or 
dots on a screen readily attribute agency to these items. Th ey see pur-
pose everywhere. Th is is taken to indicate an intrinsic mental procedure 
constitutive of human nature. To refer to this procedure, researchers 
use the expression “hypersensitive agency detection device”, HADD for 
short (Atran 2002; Barrett 2004). Th is expression is somewhat loaded 
with materialist overtones, especially evident in the term “device.” To re-
main neutral with respect to thorny debates in the philosophy of mind, 
it is better to use “disposition” rather than “device”, with the acronym 
remaining the same. With this in view, it is not diffi  cult to see how this 
cognitive feature enhances fi tness. Organisms that have it show a strong 
tendency to believe in the existence of agents when they detect certain 
kinds of stimuli. Th ey are thus wary of various circumstances – wary of 
circumstances that are genuinely dangerous and wary also of circum-
stances that are not. Although this cognitive feature delivers a lot of false 
positives, it defi nitely represents the safer strategy. In the long run, it 
is better to err on the side of being cautious than on the side of being 
reckless. Some researchers working on HADD proceed then by affi  rm-
ing that religion is essentially constituted by this disposition. It is an ex-
trapolation of HADD. Humans have religious beliefs because they have 
been naturally selected according to HADD. Th ose of our ancestors with 
religion survived. Th ose without it were fi ltered off . 
Another aspect of religion that is considered in this context is as-
sociated with the belief in invisible but super-knowing judges, in other 
words, the belief that great superhuman forces are observing and judging 
all that people do. Th is stance is associated with the origins of moral-
ity and cooperation. As has been shown, cooperation within groups can 
be the result of natural selection when two principles are in operation: 
kin-selection and reciprocity. Th is explanation is vulnerable because of 
one problem. A cooperative group remains vulnerable to free-riders or 
counterbalanced by other traits. For lack of space, this kind of argument is not being 
considered in this paper. 
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cheaters: those who receive benefi ts from the group without contribut-
ing. Such instability undermines the survival value of cooperation. Being 
a cheater, of course, needs the capacity to deceive, and this capacity var-
ies depending on the intelligence of the organisms under consideration. 
For the hominid family, therefore, it seems that cooperation should have 
disappeared early on, undermined by ever more eff ective cheating. Th e 
fact that it didn’t shows that there’s something else in the equation, some-
thing that trumps the eff ect of cheaters. And this is precisely the element 
that interests us here. Th e amazingly high degree of cooperation between 
humans shows that there is some pressure that acts against deception. So 
we postulate a cause for this pressure: it comes from a belief that, even 
though other humans are not aware of the cheating, punishment will 
still be delivered. Th ere are superhuman forces that observe and judge 
everything people do. Selfi shness and cheating must therefore be curbed 
for fear that such forces will deliver their punishment. Th e deliverer of 
such punishment is referred to by various terms, including, for instance, 
gods, witches, and dead ancestors.3 As a corollary, this view entails that 
ill fortune is a sign of hidden moral misconduct. Th e bottom line is that 
humans are religious as an outcome of their being cooperative, and they 
are cooperative because of an innate primordial belief in the existence of 
super-knowing agents who ensure that justice is done. 
So up to now we have mentioned two possible candidates for an 
adaptationist view of religion. As I said, defenders of these two candi-
dates form one camp. Th e other camp consists of those who contest the 
adaptationist view. Th ey argue that religion in itself off ers no survival 
advantage whatsoever.4 Th ey argue that religion is an epiphenomenon, 
a by-product that in itself has no adaptive value but is associated with 
some traits that do. Th e term oft en used in this context is “spandrel.” 
Th is is an architectural term referring to a structure that arises within 
a building not because it is needed but because of other structures that 
are. An example of a biological spandrel is the sound of the heartbeat. 
What is evolutionarily relevant as regards the heart is the way it pumps 
3 In this section, I draw from, Johnson & Bering (2009). Th e argument is not that this 
evolutionarily-relevant aspect is the only feature that ensures cooperation. Th ere may be 
other factors that block cheating or enhance cooperation. Th e argument, however, does 
say that the idea of a super-knowing punisher is the major relevant feature.
4 A very clear case is made in Boyer (2001).
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blood effi  ciently, not the sound it makes. Hence the production of sound 
gets a free ride, as it were, all along the evolutionary development of the 
heart. It is not fi ltered off  because, as regards natural selection, it is invis-
ible. In the same way, religion may be a free rider. It may be a phenom-
enon that exists simply because it “rides” on other human features that 
confer survival advantages, while itself being irrelevant from the point of 
view of natural selection. Some researchers have tried to gather evidence 
and build a case for this possibility, but expert scientifi c opinion shows 
no clear agreement on whether religion is indeed epiphenomenal. One 
might always object, for instance, that new evidence may turn up show-
ing that some survival advantages are indeed associated with the sound 
of heart-beat. And this shows that all epiphenomena are judged to be so 
only because of current limitations in evolutionary knowledge. Never-
theless, in line with the argument of this paper, I would like to take this 
view as the third major possible account. I think it is reasonable to say 
that religion could be an epiphenomenon. 
Th ese three possible evolutionary accounts of religion are oft en pre-
sented with anti-religious strings attached. Researchers working in this 
area oft en present their results as undermining the validity of religion in 
some way or other. Th ey take their results to show that religious claims 
are unacceptable and that religious practice is either detrimental to so-
ciety or utterly futile. How do they do this?5 Th eir critique takes various 
forms. Consider the fi rst typical argument:
 (A1) Religion is unacceptable because it is essentially a consequence 
of HADD,
  a mental operation that exaggerates the detection of agency. 
Th e force of this critique arises from the fact that HADD is unreliable. 
It exaggerates. And it is precisely because of this exaggerating tendency 
that it had been selected. On closer scrutiny, this objection loses a lot 
of its impact. Its weakness arises mainly because the critique makes no 
reference to the obvious fact that agent-detection happens all the time in 
the life of a normal human. Moreover, there is no clear dividing line be-
tween cases where agent-detection is readily verifi able and cases where 
5 For further details on these arguments, see Murray (2009). 
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agent-detection is not readily verifi able. Th ere is no clear dividing line 
between the use of HADD as regards not-yet-observed entities and its 
use as regards unobservable entities. Calling HADD unreliable should 
make us abandon it even for everyday scenarios. But abandoning HADD 
is not possible. We have stipulated at the very start of the argument that 
this disposition is advantageous for survival. So argument A1 should not 
worry defenders of religion too much.
Consider another typical criticism:
 (A2) Religion is unacceptable because its central beliefs are not caused 
by the entities they talk about; they arise from mechanisms that 
function independently from these entities.
Th is critique has bite only within the context of epistemological exter-
nalism. Within this context, knowledge claims and beliefs must have 
a proper causal relationship with the mind-independent world they talk 
about. Argument A2 presses the point that religion, as described by evo-
lutionary theories, is not caused by the objects it talks about. And this 
undermines belief about them. Th ose who want to block this critique 
have at least one clear option. Th ey can press the point that, if we assume 
that religious beliefs have been naturally selected, we are saying that they 
confer an advantage on those who have them. Take vision as an example. 
Vision confers evolutionary advantages on those who have it. It is not 
just vision that confers these advantages. It must be truthful vision. Mu-
tations that result in organisms that see things where there are no things 
to be seen are dead ends. Such organisms are fi ltered off . Hence, vision’s 
adaptive attribute is related to the realism involved in seeing. Th is exam-
ple can be extended to reason and to the mind in general. Correct rea-
soning confers evolutionary advantages because inferring and deducing 
correctly makes good reasoners survive where confused reasoners die 
off . It should be evident, therefore, that once we assume at the start that 
having religious beliefs is adaptive, we are committed to some kind of 
effi  ciency with respect to these beliefs. If kidneys and hearts are eff ective 
in their domain, it is very plausible to hold that vision and intelligence 
are also. And, if religion is a special expression of aff ective and intelligent 
engagement with the world, then religion can be considered acceptable 
on these grounds.
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A third critique of religion arises from the evolutionary account 
that takes it to be a useless by-product. In short, the objection could be 
phrased as follows.
 (A3) Religion is unacceptable because it is epiphenomenal.
Th e basic point is that religious beliefs haven’t proved their mettle by go-
ing through the fi ltering processes that shaped hominid evolution. Th ey 
are just irrelevant fossils of primordial, mental meanderings that never 
washed away. Can a defence of religion be mounted against this argu-
ment? A possible move could start from the fact that A3 dismisses much 
more than religion. It obliges us to consider all non-instrumental think-
ing epiphenomenal. And this leads to all kinds of problems. What consti-
tutes human nature is vastly determined by non-instrumental, symbolic 
thinking – by poetic and metaphorical language, art, music, literature 
and sculpture. Once we accept A3, it becomes obvious that evolutionary 
theories can account for only a very small section of the human phe-
nomenon. It would be naïve to claim that such an account exhausts all 
there is to say about human beings. It would therefore be equally naive 
to argue that religion is unacceptable because it lies beyond the range of 
evolutionary explanation.
None of the arguments and counter-arguments discussed so far is 
a knock-down argument. Th ey all invite further discussion and analysis. 
Th e main reason to include them here is not primarily to give the reader 
a taste of what is going on in this area of philosophy. It is rather to high-
light an overriding problem with all such arguments. Th ey all assume 
that the object of discussion, namely religion, is clear and precise enough 
to allow fruitful debates about it. But this assumption is misleading. To 
see why this is so, I propose excavating below the surface of these argu-
ments so as to uncover what is happening at the level of the very defi ni-
tion of religion.
Let me characterize the individual steps taken by typical anti-reli-
gious evolutionary psychologists that end up arguing in the form of A1, 
A2 or A3.
 (S1) Th ey fi rst acknowledge, consciously or unconsciously, a “re-
ceived concept” of religion, call it R (it is oft en taken to be 
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a complex agglomeration of attitudes, practices, rituals, habits, 
and so on, many of which can only be described by using vague 
predicates).
 (S2) Th ey extract from R an aspect that is evolutionarily relevant; call 
this Q. 
 (S3) Th ey show how natural selection successfully explains Q.
 (S4) Th ey claim that the success of S3 shows either that the really 
signifi cant aspect of R is Q; or that we are now, fi nally, able to 
defi ne R properly, namely as Q (hence, all there is to R is Q).
Th e basic idea behind this sequence is clear. Th e general strategy is to 
move from what may be called a hazy knowledge of something to a clear 
knowledge of it. What we have here is a refi ning process. But does the 
success of S3 really justify the reduction occurring in S4? I argue that it 
does not. 
To see why, consider fi rst, as an example, the love between husband 
and wife. Since time immemorial, love has been of central importance in 
human existence: as is evident in literature, drama, art, philosophy and 
religion. In the nineteenth century, experimental work in France and 
Germany established that special chemicals are responsible for a kind 
of communication between diff erent organs within an animal. At the 
Royal College of Physicians in London, the word “hormone” was then 
launched as the standard term for these chemicals, and since then im-
mense interest has been generated in various related research fi elds. As 
regards the specifi c issue of human love, the excitement and arousal love 
involves became understandable as the eff ect of hormones rushing from 
cell to cell along the blood stream, coordinating the action, perception 
and feeling of diff erent parts of the body. Now, if one were to suggest 
that, because of these discoveries, this empirical account should be en-
shrined as the real meaning of love, not many would be convinced – and 
with good reason. Th e depth of meaning associated with love remains to 
a very great extent completely unaff ected by these empirical discoveries, 
important as they are. When love between a husband and wife is de-
scribed as real, nothing is being said about the chemicals involved in that 
experience. What is being said is situated at another level. Th e scientifi c 
discovery changes the broad concept and experience of love only at one 
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tiny spot, if it does at all. And it makes no sense to have reductionism 
smuggled into the story. 
Th e case of religion is similar. Suppose that evolutionary psychology 
has established to everyone’s satisfaction that religion is defi nitely either 
an instance of HADD or an extrapolation of the idea of a super-knowing 
punisher, as explained above. Should this claim oblige us to reduce the 
concept to this? Should we say that now we have discovered what reli-
gion really is? On the strength of the analogy with the example above, the 
answer is no. Nothing stops us from accepting both the newly discovered 
aspect and the other associated meanings of the term not in direct con-
tradiction with the newly discovered aspects. Th is is as far as we can go 
with the analogy. 
One disanalogy with the example of love is very important. Whereas 
the empirical substrate of love can be considered a genuine part of the 
study of love, the case of religion is diff erent. Th e concept of religion 
seems to be situated within our conceptual scheme so as to enable us 
to refer to what people do when they reach out beyond what is empiri-
cally graspable. Th ere are, of course, empirically graspable religious body 
movements and social practices. But the essential feature in religion 
seems to be the meaning attributed to these empirically graspable fea-
tures, not the features themselves. Moreover, whereas the concept of love 
can perhaps be seen as one single concept, usable and reusable in vari-
ous contexts, the concept of religion is not straightforwardly unifi ed. We 
need to admit that the term religion is vague in the logical sense. It has 
no clear boundaries. What we call religions indeed share similarities be-
tween them but there is no guarantee that a core of features is shared by 
all. It is very probable that there is no such common core. Th e more data 
cultural anthropology delivers, the more the idea of a common essence 
of religion seems to drift  away; and it is certainly not useful to cover 
this up by looking away from religions as they are and speculating on 
how they should be. Th e concept of religion is like the Wittgensteinian 
concept of a game, or even worse – worse because some religions involve 
a very high degree of self-refl ection and self-adjustment, which implies 
an ongoing transformation of their very nature. 
Should we give up hope then as regards trying to understand reli-
gion with the various modes of inquiry at our disposal? Not necessarily. 
I suggest the following strategy. Since religion is such a vast and elusive 
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category, a safer method is to carve out a smaller, more manageable unit 
and work with that. Faith is one of these units. Th e aim of this inquiry, 
therefore, becomes to determine the insights that can be drawn from 
evolutionary psychology as regards faith. Th e fi rst step in this new ven-
ture will take us right across to the other end of the spectrum. From the 
scientifi cally charged explanations discussed so far, we move to theologi-
cally charged accounts of faith. Th is preliminary discussion will estab-
lish a good working defi nition of faith. Only when we have this can we 
determine whether evolutionary explanations can be successful in this 
context or not.
II. THE NATURE OF FAITH
To answer the question “What is faith?” we can adopt various strategies. 
One of them is to ask typical religious persons for their own version 
of the nature of faith. Th is method delivers a phenomenology of faith, 
and what these people report would constitute, as it were, fi rst-hand data 
with respect to which theories may be constructed and evaluated. Th e 
result of such a phenomenology of faith, however, suff ers from its high 
degree of subjectivity and context-dependence. Another strategy is to 
determine the structure of the concept of faith. One does this by analyz-
ing the grammar of faith-involving linguistic expressions. We determine 
where and how these expressions behave properly and where and how 
they break down. Th is is the typical method of analytic philosophers.6 
Yet another method is to look back and see what the major thinkers of 
the past have written on this topic and start from there. Th is strategy is 
not completely diff erent from the other two. Th e major philosophers of 
the past, of course, were themselves employing phenomenology or con-
ceptual analysis, or both. In this paper, I am adopting the third strategy, 
concentrating on Aquinas, with the occasional allusion to the second, es-
pecially when indicating how technical terms of past centuries translate 
into those in current use.7 
6 For examples of this method, see Audi (2008), Wolterstorff  (1990). 
7 Some evolutionary psychologists would, of course, fi nd this method unacceptable. 
Th ey present their views as the correct account of religion. Th ey insist that what practi-
tioners of religion like Aquinas say about it is irrelevant (e.g. Boyer 2001, p. 262-3). But 
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Th omas Aquinas builds his account of faith on two foundations: 
Aristotelian psychology, involving the categories of will and intellect, and 
Augustinian theological ideas, summed up in the formula “to believe is 
nothing other than to think with assent”.8 I will summarize the Th omist 
view in three points. First, he accepts Aristotle’s view that the human 
intellect can sometimes be determined by the will. Th is does not mean 
that, for Aristotle, I am entitled to believe the world to be so just because 
I want it to be so. He is referring to cases when we assent to a proposition 
even though we do not have enough evidence for it. In this context, we 
can take assent to mean, quite simply, agreement with or compliance to 
a proposal.9 For Aquinas, faith is such an act. It is a case of the will deter-
mining the intellect. In normal circumstances, will-motivated assent is 
partial or conditional. We say, “I assent to this claim because it’s probably 
true” or “I assent to this claim because it is a logical consequence of an-
other claim that I take to be true.” In the case of faith, however, the assent 
is complete and unconditional. Believers declare, “We believe in God”. 
Th ey don’t declare, “We take it that there’s probably a God.” In what way 
does the assent of faith diff er from normal assent? Th ere are two main 
diff erences. Th e fi rst diff erence concerns intellectual dissatisfaction. Th is 
kind of dissatisfaction arises when a person assents to a claim that, as far 
this is mistaken. It is as mistaken as its opposite, namely that only practitioners of reli-
gion can explain religion. Th e complexity of religion should make us beware of simplistic 
reductionism. Truth should be welcome whatever its source. Th e more viewpoints on the 
issue, the better. Moreover, we should not forget that Boyer and his colleagues are them-
selves explainable by sociology of science in ways that may perhaps surprise them.
8 “Credere, nihil aliud est, quam cum assensione cogitare”. St Augustine, On the Pre-
destination of Saints, Book I, chapter 5 (Patrologia Latina, vol. 44, col. 963). 
9 Th is key-term “assent” is certainly related to the term “acceptance,” which is quite 
prominent in current philosophical discussions. Th eir meaning, however, is not the same. 
Accepting that p means endorsing p deliberately, or taking p to be true for the sake of the 
argument, even if you do not believe it. Assenting to p has wider scope; you can be assent-
ing to p even if you are not at present conscious of doing so. Further analysis is needed to 
situate assent with respect to acceptance and belief, but this lies beyond the scope of this 
paper. Audi (2008) is a good starting point. Moreover, I here take the will to refer to a per-
son’s faculty of choice – certainly not to a part of the person’s body. Evolutionary psycholo-
gists would perhaps want to undermine such an Aristotelian category by breaking it down 
into small parts, perhaps by endorsing some form of modularity of mind. Th is will not af-
fect the account of faith I describe here. Whatever the background structure of willing, it 
is undeniable that people sometimes will to believe a given proposition.
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as that person knows, doesn’t enjoy suffi  cient evidential support. How do 
believers deal with this? For normal cases of assent, this dissatisfaction is 
appeased by the believer seeking more evidence. For faith, however, the 
dissatisfaction is pacifi ed by the believer acknowledging that he or she is 
acting out of trust. Th e believer believes not because of evidence, but be-
cause of the authority of God who is the guarantor of revelation. In faith, 
the will directs the intellect to assent because of its trustful submission to 
God who is recognized as infallible and omniscient. Th ere is a categori-
cal diff erence then between the certitude associated with natural sources 
of knowledge and that associated with faith. Th e former is the fruit of 
evidence and demonstration; the latter the fruit of risk that one deliber-
ately takes on because of a loving relationship.
Th e second point to highlight is the way Aquinas exposes the tension 
that exists in the very concept of faith. Th is point is fundamental for my 
argument in this paper, because in cognitive accounts of religion it is 
oft en neglected. Aquinas insists that faith involves not only the person 
who has it but also God whose extra help in this matter is indispensable. 
Th e object of the assent involves a set of truths that go beyond the grasp 
of natural reason or of science as we understand it today – Aquinas is 
here referring to truths like the truth of the Triune nature of God. Con-
sequently, the act of assent must involve a contribution that comes from 
beyond the natural capacities of humans. Moreover, there is no neat, 
two-tier structure within the idea of faith. Aquinas denies that there is 
a purely human contribution, presumably explainable by evolutionary 
psychology, and then an added divine push. To be consistent with bibli-
cal texts, he insists that God is responsible for the entire act of faith:
Th e Pelagians held that this cause [i.e. the internal cause that moves man 
inwardly to assent to matters of faith] was just man’s freewill, and conse-
quently they said that the beginning of faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as 
it is certainly in our power to be ready to assent to things which are of faith, 
but that the consummation of faith is from God, from whom are proposed 
the things we have to believe. But this is false. Since man, by assenting to 
matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this must be added to him from 
some supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. Th ere-
fore faith, as regards the assent, which is the chief act of faith, is from God 
moving man inwardly by grace.10 
10 In this paper, quotes from Aquinas are my translation, using the online version of 
Summa Th eologiae in Corpus Th omisticum (Fundación Tomás de Aquino, 2000-2009), 
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Th e third important point to highlight becomes evident when Aqui-
nas moves beyond the idea of faith as involving assent to the idea of faith 
as a virtue. Up to now, I have focused on how he equates faith with the act 
of believing particular truths of revelation. Th is is only part of the story. 
For a comprehensive grasp of his view, we need to add his distinction 
between fi des and credere. Fides is a virtue while credere is the act of as-
senting to a proposition. In general, a virtue is an excellence of a human 
faculty or habit directed towards the good. Faith is a twofold excellence. 
It involves the excellence of the intellect as it seeks absolute truth, namely 
God; and it involves also the excellence of the will as it seeks absolute 
good, again God. He writes: “For since to believe is an act of the intellect 
assenting to the truth at the command of the will, two things are required 
for this act to be perfect. One of these is that the intellect should infal-
libly tend to its good, which is the true; while the other is that it should 
be infallibly directed to the last end, by which the will assents to the true. 
And both of these are to be found in the act of mature faith.”11
With these three points in mind, we can summarize Aquinas’s overall 
view using his own words: “to believe is an act of intellect assenting to 
the divine truth by virtue of the command of the will as moved by God 
through grace”.12
It is useful here to digress a little by supplementing the above points 
with some ideas from the works of Martin Luther. Although the major, 
overarching debate in Luther’s writings on faith concerns justifi cation, 
abbreviated henceforth as ST. For hidden nuances, the reader may want to consult the 
original Latin, included in footnotes. Th is text is from ST 2a2ae Q6 a1: “Hanc autem 
causam Pelagiani ponebant solum liberum arbitrium hominis, et propter hoc dicebant 
quod initium fi dei est ex nobis, inquantum scilicet ex nobis est quod parati sumus ad as-
sentiendum his quae sunt fi dei; sed consummatio fi dei est a Deo, per quem nobis pro-
ponuntur ea quae credere debemus. Sed hoc est falsum. Quia cum homo, assentiendo his 
quae sunt fi dei, elevetur supra naturam suam, oportet quod hoc insit ei ex supernaturali 
principio interius movente, quod est Deus. Et ideo fi des quantum ad assensum, qui est 
principalis actus fi dei, est a Deo interius movente per gratiam.”
11 “Cum enim credere sit actus intellectus assentientis vero ex imperio voluntatis, 
ad hoc quod iste actus sit perfectus duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est ut infallibiliter 
intellectus tendat in suum bonum, quod est verum, aliud autem est ut infallibiliter ordi-
netur ad ultimum fi nem, propter quem voluntas assentit vero. Et utrumque invenitur in 
actu fi dei formatae.” ST 2a2ae Q4 a5.
12 ST 2a2ae Q2 a9: “credere est actus intellectus assentientis veritati divinae ex im-
perio voluntatis a Deo motae per gratiam, et sic subiacet libero arbitrio in ordine ad 
Deum.”
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a debate which is primarily theological, one can identify a valuable core 
that is essentially philosophical and complementary to the Th omistic 
views expressed above. First of all, for Luther, faith is in stark contrast to 
works. His major claim is that it is wrong to attempt to worship God ac-
cording to works only. Consider a typical claim of his: “this is the reason 
why our theology is certain: it snatches us away from ourselves, so that 
we do not depend on our own strength, conscience, experience, person 
or works but depend on that which is outside ourselves, that is, on the 
promise and truth of God, which cannot deceive.”13 We have here a clear 
expression of the idea that faith in the Word of God is not within our 
power. Faith demands that we let go of what our human knowledge de-
livers so as to cling only to the testimony of Christ. Secondly, Luther 
emphasizes the fact that faith off ers freedom from human laws and tradi-
tions. Th e coercion and constraint of human laws make individuals obey 
through fear, concerned mainly with themselves. Faith has the eff ect of 
liberating such people so that they may obey and indeed engage in good 
works in selfl essness and love. Luther writes: “the just man [i.e. the one 
with faith] lives as though he had no need of the Law to admonish, urge, 
and constrain him; but spontaneously, without any legal constraint, he 
does more than the Law requires.”14 Th irdly, Luther defends a notion of 
faith that is not concerned primarily with believing a number of proposi-
tions. He retrieved the original idea of faith as used by St Paul, namely 
the idea that faith is a characteristic of the entire person who is open to 
God. It refers to a state of a person rather than an attitude towards a set of 
propositions. Th e person of faith, on this account, is faithful to God, does 
God’s will, hopes in God, believes what God says, and so on. Faith refers 
to the entire package. For Luther, “faith is God’s work in us, that changes 
us and gives new birth from God […] Faith is a living, bold trust in God’s 
grace, so certain of God’s favor that it would risk death a thousand times 
trusting in it.”15
Luther’s focus is essentially on the lived faith. He is highlighting the 
third aspect of Aquinas’ view, namely fi des as distinct from credere. Both 
13 Luther (1955-1967), vol. 26, p. 387. See also Zachman (1993).
14 Luther (1955-1967), vol. 27, p. 96.
15 Vermischte Deutsche Schrift en, ed. J.K. Irmischer Vol. 63 (Erlangen: Heyder and 
Zimmer, 1854), pp.124-125, trans. R.E. Smith (1994), URL: http://www.iclnet.org/pub/
resources/text/wittenberg/luther/luther-faith.txt
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authors converge on this point, a fact that highlights its importance. Of 
course, the brief sketch of faith presented up to now can barely do jus-
tice to Aquinas and Luther, and it is too short to include the various 
refi nements their positions received since they were written. Neverthe-
less, even the points mentioned here are enough to indicate the basic, 
essential characteristics of faith, characteristics that ensure the right kind 
of coherence with biblical texts. So I will proceed by focusing on the area 
where the two views overlap. Whether expressed in terms of virtue or in 
terms of a way of life, faith for both can be described as follows.
 (F) Faith is a state or attribute of the person as a whole, involving an 
exercise of freedom and a special divine initiative. 
I will build on this formula, adding here just one further clarifi cation: 
that the state referred to in this statement can be manifested in various 
ways. It can be manifested when the person assents to explicit proposi-
tions. It can be manifested when the person participates in organized 
celebrations or liturgies. It can be manifested when the person makes 
decisions. Moreover, if there is no manifestation of a person’s faith, one 
cannot draw the conclusion that it is absent. All these observations fol-
low from the idea of habit, of which faith is a special kind.
III. EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNTS OF FAITH
I will now bring in the three evolutionary explanations discussed in sec-
tion one: fi rst, the account of religion as an instance of HADD; secondly, 
the account of religion as an extrapolation of the idea of a super-knowing 
punisher; and third, the account of religion as a fortuitous by-product 
with no relevance for fi tness. Are these accounts valid and useful when 
considering faith as defi ned in statement F? Th ere are three elements 
within this defi nition. It says that faith is an attribute of the person as 
a whole; it mentions freedom; and it mentions God’s initiative. 
Th e fi rst element seems to be the most readily amenable to an evolu-
tionary account. It speaks of faith as an attribute of the person as a whole, 
and thus it includes the various dispositions the person can acquire over 
time. Such dispositions, of course, can be of the individual person, or of 
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the particular group or tradition the person belongs to, or even of the 
species as a whole. As regards this aspect of faith, therefore, an evolution-
ary account can have great signifi cance. It is certainly plausible to argue 
that HADD is responsible to some extent for a disposition to believe in 
the existence of a cause of the universe. Whether this disposition needs 
to be labelled with the term “hypersensitive”, as if it involves an unjusti-
fi ed excess of something, may be disputed. But the point here is that 
there is no obvious contradiction between the evolutionary account in-
volving HADD and this aspect of the notion of faith. Th e same thing can 
be said as regards the second evolutionary explanation, the one invoking 
the belief in a super-knowing punisher. It is plausible to argue that such 
a belief in a super-knowing punisher, which is a fruit of natural selection, 
is, to some extent, responsible for a disposition to believe in the aft erlife 
and in the last judgment. Th ere is nothing intrinsically contradictory in 
making this claim, as long as we do not add the reductive clause that 
faith is this disposition and nothing else. If we move on now to those 
evolutionary psychologists who want to take the third account and argue 
that religion emerged as an epiphenomenon, we can see also that they 
will have no direct clash with the concept of faith. Th ey are just saying 
that faith is not a biological phenomenon, in the strict sense. Presum-
ably, they would say the same thing as regards Beethoven’s composing 
of the 9th Symphony, Michelangelo’s painting of the Sistine Chapel, and 
Darwin’s conceiving of evolution through natural selection. Th ey would 
acknowledge that what happens at the level of culture lies largely be-
yond the explanatory reach of evolution by natural selection. Th is is in 
line with the way some philosophers of biology explain the specifi city of 
Homo sapiens, whose appearance represents a crucial junction: the point 
where evolution gave rise to a system that is no longer within its range, 
a system that fl oats freely (Sober 1992). So, all in all, it seems plausible to 
hold that the fi rst ingredient of defi nition F can merge smoothly with all 
three evolutionary accounts.
We move on now to the second and third elements within F. Th ey are: 
the claim that faith involves an exercise of freedom and the claim that it 
involves a special divine initiative. Can these two elements of faith be ac-
counted for by an evolutionary explanation? 
Th e short answer is no to both. Th e fi rst element introduces the idea 
of freedom; and freedom refers to the capacity of rational agents to 
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choose consciously one course of action from among various alterna-
tives. Th is point introduces one of the major distinctions between the 
empirical and the human sciences. Th e objects of study for the human 
sciences diff er radically from those for the empirical sciences. Th e ob-
jects of study for the human sciences are themselves epistemic agents. 
Th ey can be infl uenced by their own awareness of the results of the very 
inquiry that is allegedly describing them objectively. To further describe 
this phenomenon, I will use the established term “refl exivity” (Geuss 
1981; Rosenberg 2007). In general, refl exivity occurs when a theory is 
such that the dissemination of its results will jeopardize its confi rmation. 
Refl exivity occurs, for instance, when a theory predicts that oil prices 
will fall; that very prediction then makes agents in society act to falsify 
it by raising prices.16 Such refl exivity embedded within the human sci-
ences has given rise to the idea that these sciences should not be con-
ceived of on the model of physics. Th ey are inherently diff erent. Th ey are 
useless for prediction but indispensable for emancipation. Th ey present 
before the human agents they study a mirror in which these agents can 
see themselves together with the ideologies that determine their action. 
Th e agents are thus enabled to look objectively on what till then had been 
unconscious, and to accept, reject or change their guiding principles. As 
regards faith, my claim is that refl exivity is central. It is not just present. It 
is constitutive of faith’s very nature. Any hint that individuals have been 
coerced to be persons of faith, undermines their status of being persons 
of faith.17 Since faith is an instance of freedom, evolutionary explanations 
can, at best, only be partial.
If we consider the other ingredient of the notion of faith, namely the 
requirement that it involves divine initiative, the situation vis-à-vis any 
16 It is interesting to recall that, in some domains, physics itself had to undergo re-
visions because of this very point. Paul Dirac explained the origin of indeterminacy in 
quantum physics by resorting to a similar scenario. Th ere is a level at which the pho-
tons used to measure the position of a micro-particle displace the micro-particle in the 
very process of measuring. Hence classical physics needs radical revision, at least at this 
level.
17 Th e centrality of freedom here points towards an interesting corollary about the 
role of reason. Individuals who feel obliged to believe that God exists because they con-
sider themselves coerced by the necessity of logical arguments are not people of faith. 
Faith is possible only through freedom and trust in God. 
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possible evolutionary explanation is the same. Th e requirement here is 
that a correct understanding of faith includes God’s action as the fi rst 
mover of the person’s process of assent. Th e reason for this, let us recall, 
is that, by faith, the person has access to truths that are not accessible nat-
urally. Aquinas concludes: “therefore faith, as regards assent, which is the 
chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.” Notice, 
fi rst of all, that this element indicates how the concept of religious faith is 
not a mere extension of the general notion of faith, evident when we talk 
of someone, say, who has faith that a colleague will succeed. Th e notion 
of religious faith is to some extent sui generis because persons who have 
such faith have it on trust – trusting the very “object” of their faith. Th ey 
do not fi rst seek a convincing argument for the existence of God and 
then start having faith by trusting him. Th ere is only one act involved. 
And God is acknowledged to be both its source and end. Now, it is clear 
that any evolutionary explanation can only range over what humans do. 
It cannot cover also what God does. So one might want to call a halt 
here to the entire inquiry. One might object to the idea of including God 
within the very defi nition of faith. Once God is in there, explanation is 
jeopardized. In other words, the very idea of explanation should be seen 
as requiring that God not be part of the explanandum. Various reasons 
could be brought forward for this requirement. Invoking God is not part 
of empirical science; invoking God is essentially explaining the unfam-
iliar by referring to something that is even less familiar; and invoking 
God off ers false satisfaction, as it tends to undercut the motivation to 
seek the structure of secondary causes. Th is objection cuts deep. It shows 
that the evolutionary psychologist disagrees here with the very defi nition 
of faith we started with. At this juncture of the debate, there is appar-
ently little more that can be done. Th e believer has one defi nition of faith. 
Th e evolutionary psychologist has another. Th ey oft en seem to be talking 
about the same thing, but in fact they are not.
Is it really as bad as that? I would like to remove this impasse by draw-
ing some insight from the clause Aquinas adds, apparently casually, in 
the statement just quoted. Th e clause in question is the qualifi cation 
regarding the assent of faith. Aquinas writes: “faith, as regards assent, 
which is the chief act of faith, […].” He calls the assent the chief act of 
faith, principalis actus fi dei. I take him to indicate thereby that there are 
other aspects of faith apart from the one he calls principal, other aspects 
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that he would call secondary. And I propose that among these other as-
pects there are some features that are perfectly explainable via evolution-
ary accounts. 
To support this claim, I off er a sketch of a synthetic view, merging 
an evolutionary account with the theologically charged understanding 
of faith described in statement F. Th is can be derived from an analogy 
between faith and morals. As regards acting morally, one is sometimes 
predisposed to do the good by a spontaneous desire or emotion, as when 
a mother helps her child automatically. But acting in this way doesn’t 
show the heights of moral virtue. In fact, acting in this way reduces the 
moral value, the praiseworthiness, of the act. Th e mother can be said to 
be fully mature in her moral virtue when she helps her child wilfully, aft er 
a deliberate acceptance of her natural and primordial, aff ective drive. She 
helps her child even, say, when he has grown up and is not responding 
favourably to her anymore. Notice that the predisposition of a mother to 
help her child is indeed explainable via evolutionary considerations – in 
the same way as the same disposition of many other animals towards 
their off spring.
Now what has been said as regards morals can also be said as regards 
faith. Th e human person can be predisposed to believe truths about the 
divine and to live accordingly. Such predispositions can be explainable as 
arising out of features like HADD, or out of the idea of a super-knowing 
punisher, or via some other feature not yet discovered. When the person 
has beliefs of this kind and lives accordingly, we can legitimately call that 
person a person of faith, but only in a very superfi cial or rudimentary 
sense. Such a person acts religiously because compelled to do so by dis-
positions for which he or she is not responsible. Being religious in this 
way certainly doesn’t show the heights of the virtue of faith, and some 
would even say that, strictly speaking, the person here would only have 
a shadow of faith, not faith itself. Be that as it may, the crucial step oc-
curs when the person starts to accept deliberately the general drive these 
dispositions suggest, and fi nally arrives at accepting the divine with the 
right motivation, namely love of God.18 My argument here resembles the 
18 I am not suggesting that there is literally a defi nite stage in a person’s life when de-
sires change into conceptualized desires, allowing the person to choose to act in line or 
not in line with them. Th e transition is gradual as the individual grows to maturity; and, 
even then, desires and dispositions become conceptualized only when they are the focus 
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thinking of Aquinas, but is not exactly like his. Consider his concise way 
of putting it:
[…] in moral virtues, a passion which precedes choice diminishes the 
praiseworthiness of the virtuous act. For just as a man ought to perform acts 
of moral virtue on account of the judgment of reason, and not on account 
of a passion, so ought he to believe matters of faith, not because of human 
reason, but because of Divine authority.19
Aquinas is here using the analogy between morals and faith. He is ef-
fectively drawing the analogy by saying that passion is to reason (for 
morals) as reason is to trust in God (for faith). So, in his version, pas-
sion, as such, does not appear on the side of faith. I am suggesting that 
it could. A passion may indeed be involved in faith. Of course, the term 
“passion” here is to be understood in the medieval sense, namely as a re-
ceived disposition. I am suggesting that primordial dispositions, ham-
mered into the human species through millennia of natural selection, 
are the rudiments of faith. I concede that the dimension I am introduc-
ing could be contestable. Th e main contention could arise because the 
preambles of faith, praeambula fi dei, have traditionally been associated 
exclusively with a set of truths, truths that natural reason can know of 
God independently of revelation.20 Th ey were not taken to include dis-
positions. My suggestion is in fact saying that these preambles include 
not only a set of truths but also some basic somatic dispositions. In other 
words, I’m urging that some bodily habits are conducive to the faith, 
and are presupposed by it. Such bodily habits are the material, as it were, 
on which faith fl ourishes. Th e suggestion is justifi ed to the extent that 
faith, as expressed in statement F, is a state or attribute of the person as 
a whole: body, mind, community. If this fi nal step in my reasoning is cor-
rect, the overall bottom line is that evolutionary explanations can indeed 
of attention. It is arguable that this change from being desire-driven to being reason-
driven occurs also gradually all along the evolution of the Hominidae family.
19 ST 2a2ae Q2 a10: “[…] passio praecedens electionem in virtutibus moralibus di-
minuit laudem virtuosi actus. Sicut enim homo actus virtutum moralium debet exercere 
propter iudicium rationis, non propter passionem; ita credere debet homo ea quae sunt 
fi dei non propter rationem humanam, sed propter auctoritatem divinam.” 
20 Th e nature of the praeambula fi dei is not a completely settled issue. For current 
contrasting views, see McInerny (2006), Wippel (2000).
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merge smoothly with a theological understanding of faith, even though 
they account for some of its aspects and not all.
CONCLUSION
My original aim in this paper was to answer the question: “Does evo-
lutionary explanation undermine religion?” I started with an overview 
of the way evolutionary explanation is being extended beyond biology 
to cover also the area of religion. I highlighted the three major argu-
ments that are oft en used to undermine religion, but I argued that each 
of the three attacks has a possible counter-argument that neutralizes it. 
Th e fundamental problem beneath these arguments and counterargu-
ments is that “religion” is too broad a term to allow valuable analysis. 
So I proceeded by reducing some of the vagueness inherent within the 
inquiry. I did this by concentrating on the notion of faith rather than 
religion. To secure a working defi nition of faith, suitable for the kind of 
inquiry engaged in here, I extracted its major ingredients from Aquinas 
and proceeded by evaluating how the previously mentioned evolution-
ary accounts of religion fare when dealing with faith. Th e results showed 
that, although parts of the concept of faith are in principle beyond the 
range of evolutionary explanation, other parts are not. I supported this 
further by sketching an account of faith wherein an evolutionary expla-
nation merges smoothly with its theological aspects. My original ques-
tion therefore has not been answered but transformed. And as regards 
its new version “Does evolutionary explanation undermine the notion 
of faith?” the answer is no.
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